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ABSTRACT
We live in a time when billions of IoT devices are being deployed
and increasingly relied upon. This makes ensuring their availability
and recoverability in case of a compromise a paramount goal. The
large and rapidly growing number of deployed IoT devices make
manual recovery impractical, especially if the devices are dispersed
over a large area. Thus, there is a need for a reliable and scalable
remote recovery mechanism that works even after attackers have
taken full control over devices, possibly misusing them or trying to
render them useless.
To tackle this problem, we present Lazarus, a system that enables
the remote recovery of compromised IoT devices. With Lazarus,
an IoT administrator can remotely control the code running on
IoT devices unconditionally and within a guaranteed time bound.
This makes recovery possible even in case of severe corruption
of the devices’ software stack. We impose only minimal hardware
requirements, making Lazarus applicable even for low-end con-
strained off-the-shelf IoT devices. We isolate Lazarus’s minimal
recovery trusted computing base from untrusted software both in
time and by using a trusted execution environment. The temporal
isolation prevents secrets from being leaked through side-channels
to untrusted software. Inside the trusted execution environment,
we place minimal functionality that constrains untrusted software
at runtime.
We implement Lazarus on an ARM Cortex-M33-based micro-
controller in a full setup with an IoT hub, device provisioning and
secure update functionality. Our prototype can recover compro-
mised embedded OSs and bare-metal applications and prevents
attackers from bricking devices, for example, through flash wear
out. We show this at the example of FreeRTOS, which requires
no modifications but only a single additional task. Our evaluation
shows negligible runtime performance impact and moderate mem-
ory requirements.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the Internet of Things (IoT) becoming increasingly pervasive
and a focal topic in computing, more andmore IoT devices are rolled
out. Driven by cost savings and short product development cycles,
a vast number of IoT business use cases have emerged, making
IoT a disruptive technology. Examples are home automation [12],
farming [42], sensor networks [37], Car2X [9], industrial IoT [48], or
smart devices like tools [18], traffic lights [25] or vending machines
[8], to name only a few. These devices are typically connected
via (wireless) networks to a hub, a back-end server located in the
cloud or managed by an enterprise. The growing importance of
IoT deployments for public safety and business processes makes
them an attractive target for attackers. This has been demonstrated
by a large number of attacks [10, 29], such as the Mirai [30] or the
Hajime botnet [44].
An important property of the IoT domain is that many devices
with identical software stacks and configurations can likely be
found in the field. This makes identified vulnerabilities or mis-
configurations highly scalable, allowing attackers to potentially
compromise a large number of devices. Especially small and cheap
devices, oftentimes poorly secured, can be found in large num-
bers [17]. Even more alarming is the threat of attackers making
such devices refuse communication and updates from the hub or
permanently damaging them. In consequence, devices have to be
manually recovered by replacing them or resetting them with clean
software. As billions of devices (managed by amuch smaller number
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of administrators) are deployed (often geographically dispersed),
manual recovery becomes completely impractical.
As a solution to this problem, several cyber-resilient IoT archi-
tectures have been proposed [5, 52, 54]. These architectures enable
remote recovery of infected IoT devices within a time bound re-
gardless of compromise. State-of-the-art architectures [5, 52, 54]
employ a minimal, early-boot recovery Trusted Computing Base
(TCB) and a reset trigger that preempts compromised software. The
recovery TCB ensures that only software authorized by the hub
runs on the device. If no such software is present, the recovery TCB
downloads the software from the hub and replaces the existing
outdated or compromised stack. The reset trigger ensures that a
reset into the recovery TCB will eventually happen even if software
actively refuses the reset. Both the recovery TCB and reset trigger
are isolated from untrusted software at runtime. This prevents mal-
ware from modifying the recovery TCB and from interfering with
the reset trigger. An example of a reset trigger is the Authenticated
Watchdog Timer (AWDT) [54]. After having been initialized, the
AWDT will force a device reset after a certain time period, unless it
is serviced with cryptographically protected “tickets”. These tickets
cannot be forged by software on the device but only be issued by
the hub. As a consequence, as soon as the hub stops issuing tickets,
e.g., when a zero-day vulnerability becomes known, or when the
device behaves suspiciously, the AWDT will eventually time out
and trigger a reset. A similar timer called “latchable WDT” [52]
will power cycle a device within a specified time interval after its
activation.
With resilient IoT architectures, we envision a world of self-
healing IoT deployments where all IoT devices can be reliably re-
covered even if they are compromised. However, existing cyber-
resilient IoT architectures which target primarily higher-end IoT
devices do not address several critical real-world problems which
must be solved to fulfill this vision even for low-cost microcon-
trollers. This includes
1) Hardware requirements. Current designs require hardware
that typically does not exist or would incur additional cost on
weaker, low-cost Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices such
as Microcontroller Units (MCUs). Examples are “storage latches”
to write-protect the recovery TCB from untrusted software, or the
AWDT peripheral that was realized previously as a separate MCU
and attached to the main board [54]. For small MCU-based IoT
devices, this makes the AWDT a feature as complex as the class of
devices it is intended to protect. For storage latches, CIDER [54]
relied on eMMC memory chips which are relatively complex and
expensive and typically not available on small MCU-based devices.
2) Preventing attackers from disabling devices. Existing
work neglects attacks in which the adversary tries to make a device
unavailable. Examples include entering low-power or off states in
which the reset trigger becomes inactive, wearing out flash mem-
ory [46], or disabling the networking hardware which is needed to
replace corrupted software on the device.
3) Updates of the recovery TCB. After devices have been de-
ployed, vulnerabilities in the recovery TCB itself may be discovered,
or cryptographic requirements may change. It is essential to patch
such vulnerabilities in a timely manner before they can be exploited
by attackers.
This paper presents the Lazarus system, a cyber-resilient IoT
architecture that solves these three problems. Lazarus targets low-
cost COTS MCUs. We take advantage of the recent addition of a
general-purpose Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to low-end
ARM MCUs in the ARMv8-M architecture. As the ARMv8-M re-
places earlier models, we expect TEEs to become widely available in
low-endMCUs in the coming years. A key observation in the design
of Lazarus is that the security hardware required by cyber-resilient
architectures can be emulated by software running inside a TEE.
Furthermore, the TEE can mediate access by untrusted software to
critical system state.
In particular, we implement storage write protection latches
and the AWDT in software running in the TEE. We call our reset
trigger “TEETrigger.” With this design, we enable the AWDT to be
realized on existing COTS devices and do not make assumptions on
trusted peripherals for storage latches and reset triggers. Our design
prevents attackers from making devices permanently unavailable
by interposing between untrusted software and peripherals that
are critical for availability. We call these “critical peripherals” and
use the TEE to regulate or block access by untrusted software,
preventing their misuse. Finally, existing IoT architectures use the
Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE) for authentication
and attestation to verify whether authorized software is present
on the device. This enables the hub to authenticate the deployed
software stack. However, as the hash of the boot code is part of the
DICE attestation identity, an update of the recovery TCB will give
the device a new DICE identity that the hub cannot predict. This
makes it impossible for the hub to recognize device identities after
a TCB update and to verify if an update was actually installed or
not. To overcome this problem, we propose an extension to DICE,
which we call DICE++. Our extension enables devices to provide
proof that a designated update was applied and sustains a device’s
identity across updates of the recovery TCB.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of Lazarus on low-end devices
by implementing a prototype on an existing COTS low-end MCU
based on the new ARMv8-M processor family. We make use of the
isolation capabilities of TrustZone-M to isolate the recovery TCB
from untrusted software and to build an AWDT without requiring
additional hardware. We make the following contributions:
• We design Lazarus, a resilient IoT architecture for off-the-
shelf IoT devices. The design of Lazarus respects even the
weakest class of IoT devices and protects against attackers
actively aiming to render devices useless. With TEETrigger,
Lazarus includes a zero-cost reset trigger, the first of its kind.
Our design relies on a TEE which is provided by modern
processors.
• We design DICE++ which enables updates of the recovery
TCB without loss of device identity.
• We implement a prototype on Lazarus on a recent ARM
Cortex-M33 based MCU, the NXP LPC5500 [33]. We leverage
the new TrustZone-M extension for ARM Cortex-M CPUs
and ensure portability across different ARMv8-M devices.
Our implementation includes a full setup featuring an IoT
hub, device provisioning and update functionality.
• We demonstrate how to protect an embedded OS, FreeRTOS
[39], with our prototype. The OS modifications are limited
to adding a single supplementary task for extending TEE-
Trigger in coordination with the hub.
• We provide a security discussion and an evaluation of the
runtime and boot time performance impact as well as of the
memory requirements, showing the practicability of Lazarus.
2 BACKGROUND
This section provides background for the rest of the paper.
2.1 Latches
The code and data of Lazarus on storage requires protection while
untrusted software executes. Latches [54] can be used to protect
critical code and data from being overwritten or read out by un-
trusted software. Conceptually, a latch is a state machine with two
states, open and locked. A reset puts the latch into the open state.
Software can put the latch into the locked state (e.g., by writing to
a hardware register). Importantly, the only action or event that can
return the latch to the open state is a reset. A latch has an associated
security function which allows some action (e.g., writing to certain
flash regions) if and only if the latch is in the open state.
Latches allow trusted boot software that runs directly after a
reset to have full access to all hardware resources but to selec-
tively disable access to some of these resources to (less trusted)
software running subsequently on the device. A read-write latch
(RWLatch) can be used to protect secrets, for instance, and a write
latch (WRLatch) to protect the integrity of data.
2.2 DICE
DICE [49, 50] is an industry standard designed to enable attestation
on low-end devices with only minimal hardware support. DICE has
been adopted by major MCU manufacturers such as NXP [34] or
Microchip [26] and cloud providers [38]. DICE is significantly more
light-weight than alternatives such as the TPM [45]. A DICE device
has a unique secret, the UniqueDevice Secret (UDS) that is protected
by a latch. After a reset, DICE measures the first mutable software
componentM (e.g., a boot loader) and uses a one-way function to
derive a symmetric key, called Compound Device Identifier (CDI),
from this measurement and the UDS. Next, DICE makes the UDS
inaccessible until the next reset, discloses the CDI toM and invokes
M. This providesM with an identity that is unique to bothM and
the device and that forms the foundation for DICE attestation.
Critically, the DICE standard prescribes that the computation of
the CDI must not be performed by mutable software, i.e., by soft-
ware that can be modified or updated. While a device manufacturer
may choose to implement the computation of the CDI in software,
this software is fixed (e.g., burned into ROM) and not under the
control of the device owner. This fact together with the method by
which the CDI is derived implies that (a) any modification ofM
will result in a different CDI and (b) the new CDI is unpredictable,
as the UDS is only known to the device’s DICE component, and the
CDI is derived from the UDS via a one-way function.
DICE can be leveraged for lightweight device attestation, for
instance for IoT devices connecting to a hub [51].M (or codeM
trusts) uses the CDI to derive two asymmetric key pairs, called the
DeviceID and the AliasID, and uses the DeviceID private key to
sign the AliasID certificate. Then,M removes all remnants of the
CDI and the DeviceID private key and provides untrusted software
only with the AliasID key pair and the certificates. This results in
a cryptographic chain from the UDS and the CDI to the DeviceID
and the AliasID based on the state of a device’s software stack.
Untrusted software can use the AliasID as a device identifier for
authentication and attestation.
2.3 MCU Model
Microcontroller units typically combine one or two low-end micro-
processor cores with moderate amounts of RAM and flash memory
and various simple devices such as watchdog timers and security
features such as DICE. With the introduction of ARMv8-M and
TrustZone for Cortex-M, TEEs are rapidly becoming prevalent even
in the low-end MCU market.
This paper is based on an MCU model whose processor(s) sup-
port two privilege levels (privileged and unprivileged) which are
comparable to user and kernel mode and which allow a simple
“operating system kernel” to protect itself from applications. In ad-
dition, our MCU model supports DICE and, more importantly, a
TEE. The assumed DICE support is not critical because, as we will
show, Lazarus can implement DICE in software.
Our model of a TEE is based on TrustZone for Cortex-M, the de
facto standard TEE for MCUs. Our TEE model isolates between two
operating environments: a higher-privileged trusted world and a
lower-privileged normal world. After a reset, boot code can assign
various resources to either the trusted or the normal world. This
includes devices as well as RAM and flash which can be assigned
to either the trusted or the normal world in chunks of different
granularities. Code running in the normal world can only access
those resources that have been assigned to it.
3 THREAT MODEL
The software on the device is composed of Lazarus and the main
IoT application logic. The latter may include an OS and applications
running on it, a hypervisor, or bare-metal applications and is subject
to compromise by a remote attacker. We assume the attacker to be
capable of arbitrarily compromising this untrusted software. This
includes the possibility that attacker code persists across device
resets. An example is the exploitation of software vulnerabilities
or misconfigurations of the OS or application logic. With these
capabilities, the attacker is able to control common IoT devices at
will and to make them unavailable.
Lazarus is composed of its core TCB and a downloader, i.e. a
networking stack that allows Lazarus to communicate directly with
the hub. We assume the core TCB to be immune to compromise as
it is small and well isolated from a potential attacker. In contrast,
we only assume the more exposed downloader to work correctly
when not under attack. The core TCB puts protections in place that
allow easy recovery from a compromise of the downloader.
We assume the hardware to work correctly according to specifi-
cation. For instance, the attacker cannot alter code in ROM, or in-
terfere with peripherals shielded by the TEE. However, the attacker
may be able to leak secrets from the TEE, e.g., as demonstrated
by Lapid and Wool [24]. The attacker is unable to efficiently break
state-of-the-art cryptographic primitives.
The attacker may eavesdrop on the communication channel be-
tween device and hub as well as forge or tamper with messages.
However, the attacker can block the channel only for a limited
amount of time. We consider prolonged attacks on the commu-
nication channel to be detectable and remediatable by network
operators.
The focus of this paper is the protection of IoT devices. The hub, a
web service likely to reside in a commercial cloud, can be protected
with the full array of industrial-strength IT security solutions and
is outside scope of this paper. Thus, we consider the hub to be
immune to attacks. The same holds for the environment in which
devices are provisioned. As we focus on scalable attacks, we leave
physical attacks requiring proximity of the attacker to a device out
of scope.
4 DESIGN OF LAZARUS
In this section, we describe the design of Lazarus, for which we com-
bine several hardware and software building blocks. To overcome
the three problems of existing cyber-resilient IoT architectures
listed in the introduction, we set the following design goals:
DG-I Strong isolation of Lazarus from untrusted software while
minimizing hardware requirements. This makes Lazarus ap-
plicable on a wide range of low-cost MCU-based IoT devices.
DG-II Prevent malware from damaging devices or making them
permanently unavailable.
DG-III Provide a stable device identity and attestation of the soft-
ware stack even in case of an update to Lazarus.
DG-IV Lazarus should require only minimal changes in existing
OS and application software.
In support of DG-I, we will realize the reset trigger TEETrigger
and latches in software. We achieve DG-II by regulating access
by untrusted software to peripherals critical for the availability of
devices such as a Flash Memory Controller (FMC). Lazarus requires
only the following hardware:
Entropy source to ensure freshness and non-forgeability of mes-
sages Lazarus exchanges with the hub, e.g., a Hardware Ran-
dom Number Generator (HRNG).
Orderly reset to allow Lazarus to execute deterministically from
a clean state after reset, regardless of prior state.
TEE for realizing latches, TEETrigger, and for controlling access
to critical peripherals.
Ordinary watchdog timer (WDT) as a building block for TEE-
Trigger. This simple device is commonly included in MCUs
to detect software crashes and reset the device. Software is
expected to service the WDT periodically. The WDT will
reset the device if it has not been serviced for some amount
of time.
These hardware features exist on a broad set of modern MCUs. In
contrast to CIDER [54], Lazarus requires neither hardware latches,
nor an external reset trigger.
Lazarus is split between a trusted boot loader and a runtime
component that executes inside the TEE concurrently with the
untrusted software which runs outside the TEE. After a reset, the
boot loader runs DICE++. Subsequently, similar to the CIDER boot
loader, it may download and install updates to the untrusted soft-
ware. Finally, it initializes the Lazarus runtime component in the
TEE and transfers control to the untrusted software.
We first describe how we construct latches and TEETrigger to
isolate Lazarus from untrusted software (DG-I). Then, we focus on
the isolation of critical peripherals (DG-II) and on our extension of
DICE (DG-III). Finally, we describe how we use these mechanisms
to design our end-to-end system and refer to DG-IV.
4.1 Construction of Latches
Lazarus has to protect its binaries and data in flash from being
corrupted by the untrusted software. We configure the TEE to
make the flash range that stores Lazarus code or data inaccessible
to the untrusted world. Effectively, this constitutes a latch, as the
restrictions will stay in place until the next reset, and the untrusted
software has no means of unlocking the latch. We use the same
mechanism to protect RAM for the Lazarus runtime component
running in in the TEE.
DICE without hardware support: On MCUs without hardware
support for DICE, we can use our TEE-based latches to build DICE
in software. The software consists of the UDS (i.e., a unique secret)
and code that hashes the next binary and derives the CDI from
it and the UDS. This code runs immediately after a reset. Its last
action is to read-write-latch itself including the UDS, thus making
itself and the UDS inaccessible until the next reset. Control and the
CDI are then transferred to the Lazarus boot code.
4.2 Construction of TEETrigger
We use the TEE and the WDT to construct our reset trigger TEE-
Trigger. TEETrigger is software running in the secure world which
exposes the standard AWDT interfaces [54] to the normal world.
A simple TEETrigger version could implement the AWDT initial-
ization call by storing the hub’s public key (provided as a parameter)
and starting the hardware WDT with the timeout value from the
AWDT initialization call. A second AWDT function generates a
nonce using the HRNG, stores it in trusted memory and also re-
turns the nonce to the untrusted caller. Untrusted application code
can use the nonce to request a deferral ticket for the AWDT from the
hub. If the hub issues such a ticket, the untrusted application code
can use the third AWDT interface to request deferral of AWDT ex-
piration and, thus, device reset to be postponed. TEETrigger could
implement this third call by using the public key that was provided
during initialization to verify the signature on the deferral ticket
and only servicing the WDT if the signature verification succeeds
and the nonce from the deferral ticket matches the stored nonce.
In practice, the situation is complicated by a mismatch between
the timeout intervals supported by most existing hardware WDTs
(at most few minutes) and those expected of AWDTs (hours to
weeks). In order to support AWDT timeout intervals that are not
limited by those of the WDT hardware, we take advantage of a
WDT feature that causes the WDT to issue an interrupt a short
time before resetting the device. This interrupt warns software that
a device reset is imminent. We maintain a counter which is set to a
positive value during AWDT initialization. Our interrupt handler
will decrement the counter and service the WDT if and only if
the result is not negative. For example, if the WDT hardware only
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Figure 1: Interposition between untrusted software and crit-
ical peripherals through handlers in the TEE.
supports timeout intervals of up to one minute, and we desire a 10
minute timeout for the AWDT, we can set the counter to 10 during
initialization or after a valid deferral ticket has been received. This
will cause TEETrigger to service the hardware WDT ten times for
a ten minute timeout interval.
4.3 Isolation of Critical Peripherals
Untrusted software should be able to execute unconstrained and
thus be allowed to access peripherals. However, to assure recover-
ability, we must regulate its access to certain critical peripherals.
Otherwise, untrusted code could, for instance, put devices into an
irrecoverable low-power state, wear out flash, or permanently dis-
able peripherals used for communication. This would make devices
permanently unavailable and could even cause physical damage.
Therefore, the Lazarus runtime component running in the trusted
world of the TEE interposes between the untrusted code and these
critical peripherals. We define a set of entry points into the TEE to
allow untrusted software controlled access to critical peripherals.
Figure 1 depicts this with “peripheral handlers” serving as entry
points into the TEE.
An example of illicit use of critical peripherals is excessive flash
writes by untrusted software. Even though the storage of trusted
components of Lazarus may be latched using the TEE, excessive
writes to unprotected storage locations could still cause flash to
wear out. flash writes are handled via an FMC. This is why we
define the FMC as a critical peripheral to be only accessible from
within the TEE. For persisting data, untrusted software must then
use our entry point to the TEE, where our trusted FMC handler
manages write requests. Note that writing to flash is generally a
slow operation. Interposing on such operations will have a limited
performance impact.
Untrusted software might receive data from the hub, such as
updates, or retrieve other data (e.g., from sensors) it has to store.
When our flash write handler in the TEE receives a flash write
attempt, it only allows:
• Writing to unprotected flash memory areas (areas that are
not latched). This includes areas storing code and data of
untrusted software and a staging area for storing updates.
Writes to latched areas (storing Lazarus) are prohibited. This
prevents untrusted software from circumventing the TEE’s
WRLatch for Lazarus code by using the handler.
• A reasonable amount of flash writes. We assume that for
flash write events, a reasonable threshold or rate limitation
RESET DICE++ RecoveryTCBdev_uuid,
static_sym
CDIUDS Alias ID
X (only at first boot)
Device ID
Figure 2:Modification toDICE (in gray) to exchange a shared
secret and static identifier with the hub at first device boot.
to regulate flash writes can be determined at design time of
an IoT use case.
The FMC is one example of a critical peripheral and its presence
or criticality may depend on the IoT use case and device type.
The absolute minimum set of critical peripherals that need to be
protected for Lazarus are:
• Storage controllers allowing to write persistent storage sub-
ject to wear out.
• Power control peripherals that can put the device into low
power modes or turn the device off.
• The WDT used by TEETrigger.
If a handler in the TEE detects illicit use of peripherals, it will reset
the device. This allows remediation through Lazarus and can help
the hub detect faulty behavior or compromise of business logic.
Other peripherals such as networking devices or other storage con-
trollers may be critical depending on the device type and IoT use
case. Our prototype demonstrates that adapting the untrusted soft-
ware to this protection mechanism requires only minor adaptations
to certain library function calls (DG-IV).
4.4 Extension of DICE
To achieve design goal DG-III, we introduce a mechanism that al-
lows updating early-boot code like Lazarus without loss of device
identity. Updating early boot code like Lazarus is essential in prac-
tice, e.g. when updating cryptographic implementations or when
an exploitable vulnerability has been identified. However, updating
an early-boot component like Lazarus results in an unpredictable
CDI and thus in a new DeviceID and AliasID. A hub knowing de-
vices and their identities has no means of relating the new and old
DeviceID after an update and has no way to verify that the update
was indeed applied.
As a practical solution for updating early-boot code without
loosing the device identity, we propose DICE++ as an extension
to DICE. DICE++ enables devices to provide the hub with crypto-
graphic proof of identity after a change in the DeviceID. This allows
the hub to associate the old and the new DeviceID and AliasID and
to verify that devices have properly applied their early-boot code
update. DICE++ thus minimizes the amount of code that cannot be
updated in practice. Our design of DICE++ can supplement existing
DICE implementations on shipped devices, which we demonstrate
in Section 5. The first part of this section describes device provi-
sioning while the second part explains device authentication after
an update of early-boot code.
Device Provisioning. Our idea for re-associating device identities
after an update of an early-boot component is to use a static se-
cret and identifier shared between device and hub. We create the
secret and identifier on the device in a secure environment during
RESET DICE ++
dev_uuid,
core_authx+1
Recovery
TCB
Device ID
CDIUDS Alias ID
dev_uuid,
dev_authx+1
Untrusted
Soware Hub
Alias ID
dev_uuid,
dev_authx+1
Figure 3: Modification to DICE key derivation and identity-
based attestation (in gray) for updating the recovery TCB.
provisioning and exchange it with the hub. After an update, the
device with a new DeviceID uses the static identifier for making
an “identity claim”. The hub requests proof of possession of the
respective shared secret to verify a device’s identity claim.
At the first boot of a device, DICE++ randomly generates the
static identifier dev_uuid . Further DICE++ derives the shared se-
cret static_sym as follows: static_sym := KDF (UDS,dev_uuid).
The secret static_sym is derived with a one way function based on
the UDS and the static identifier, allowing no conclusions on the
UDS. Both dev_uuid and static_sym remain unchanged when an
early-boot component is updated. We use a secret different than
the UDS to share with the hub, because static_sym is less security
critical. static_sym is only used for re-association, not for regular
attestation/authentication. Device identities are not compromised
should static_sym ever leak. In contrast, if the burnt-in UDS leaks,
the device is irrecoverably compromised. In such cases, we can re-
generate dev_UU ID, which causes derivation of a new static_sym,
avoiding loss of a device.
Being in a secure environment, dev_uuid , static_sym and the
initial DeviceID are read out and transferred to the hub. For this
purpose, DICE++ provides dev_uuid and static_sym once at first
boot to the next layer. At this time, early-boot code and environment
can still be trusted. It is also possible to exchange dev_uuid and
static_sym online after enrollment. In this case, the early-boot
component generates the structure X at initial boot and sends it to
the hub on first connection:
X := siд(enc(dev_uuid |static_sym)Hubpub )DeviceID1pr iv
This means that the early-boot component encrypts static_sym
and dev_uuid with the hub public key and signs it with its ini-
tial DeviceID private key, enabling confidential and authenticated
transmission. The derivations at first boot are depicted in Figure 2.
Re-Association after Update. At every boot, DICE++ generates
an additional key other than the CDI for the early-boot component.
We call this key core_auth, which DICE++ derives as follows:
core_authx := KDF (static_sym,hash(Mx |dev_uuid))
This key depends on the current version x of the early-boot compo-
nentM on the device and allows it to authenticate itself. DICE++
hashes the early-boot component appended with the identifier
dev_uuid and uses it with static_sym as input to a Key Derivation
Function (KDF). The key core_authx can only be computed with
knowledge of static_sym and indicates that the software stackM
in version x was measured on the device with dev_uuid . An up-
date to version x + 1 causes an independent derivation of the key
core_authx+1. Only DICE++ and the hub are able to derive this key
as it depends on static_sym and thus cannot be forged or predicted.
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Figure 4: Boot flow of Lazarus including latching, TEE-
Trigger initialization and peripheral handler setup.
The early-boot component receives this key fromDICE++, which
it uses to derive an “identity token”, which we call dev_auth. Using
dev_authx+1, a modified early-boot component can prove to the
hub that it was successfully updated and is running on exactly the
device with the prior DeviceID. The derivations for core_auth and
dev_auth are illustrated by Figure 3. To compute dev_authx+1, the
early-boot component uses core_authx+1 as key for a Hash-based
MAC (HMAC) over the new DeviceID and dev_uuid , i.e.,
dev_authx+1 := HMAC(core_authx+1,DeviceIDx+1pub |dev_uuid)
dev_authx+1 can only be computed by an early-boot component
exactly in version x + 1 running on the device dev_uuid and be-
longs to the DeviceID in version x + 1. dev_authx+1 depends on
core_authx+1 which is only present after a correct update to ver-
sion x + 1. Thus, dev_authx+1 cannot be forged either. Early-boot
code can now pass dev_authx+1 and dev_uuid to the next layer to
handle the identity claim, for instance by integrating it into the
DeviceID certificate. When the hub receives a claim of a device with
DeviceID in version x + 1 to be identified as device with dev_uuid ,
the hub requests the identity token. The hub computes the expected
identity token on its side as all parameters are known to the hub.
In case the received and expected token match, re-association is
complete and the new DeviceID accepted.
4.5 End-to-End System
This part describes how we compose our TEE-based latching, our
TEETrigger, the protection mechanism for critical peripherals and
DICE++ in our end-to-end system, Lazarus. We use CIDER [54] as
a basis for this. Figure 4 illustrates the boot flow of Lazarus. Our
first step is to apply temporal isolation, i.e., to execute the core
functionalities of Lazarus before untrusted software like update
download functionality or business logic executes. This means that
the core part of Lazarus executes directly after an orderly reset.
After a reset, we execute DICE++ (including DICE, run by the
MCU). After activating the latches, Lazarus executes its main func-
tionality “Lazarus Core” on the next lower security tier in the TEE.
Lazarus Core checks whether an update for business logic or
for Lazarus itself is pending, i.e., whether an update candidate was
stored in the “staging area” on persistent storage. If so, Lazarus Core
verifies the integrity and authenticity of the update using a public
key it received during device provisioning and a version number.
If the update is valid, Lazarus Core applies the updates and resets.
Otherwise, e.g., if it has been tampered with in the communica-
tion channel, Lazarus Core executes its “update downloader”. The
downloader contacts the hub to retrieve authenticated software.
The downloader, technically part of Lazarus, has a significant
attack surface, as it has to handle arbitrary packets from the in-
ternet. Lazarus Core thus considers it untrusted software. This is
why Lazarus executes the update downloader in the same security
tier as business logic outside the TEE. Before executing untrusted
software, Lazarus Core WRLatches itself including the downloader
on storage. This gives the update downloader the same storage
protection as Lazarus Core. In addition, Lazarus Core WRLatches
the main memory region occupied by trusted runtime components
running alongside untrusted software. Further, Lazarus Core ini-
tializes TEETrigger and constrains access to critical peripherals.
Lazarus Core also derives the respective DeviceID and AliasID key
material according to the DICE specification for untrusted software.
In case no update is pending, Lazarus Core checks for the pres-
ence of a “boot ticket” in the staging area. The boot ticket is an
accreditation of the hub to boot one time into business logic with-
out requiring further interaction with the hub through the update
downloader. Without a valid boot ticket present, Lazarus Core tries
to acquire a boot ticket using the update downloader. The down-
loader attests the device’s software stack to the hub by presenting
the DeviceID and AliasID. If the hub is satisfied, it issues a boot
ticket. Like a deferral ticket, the boot ticket is a hub-signed data
structure that contains a nonce for ensuring freshness. Lazarus
Core generates and stores a fresh nonce at each reset. Upon reset,
Lazarus Core can verify the signature of a staged boot ticket and
compare the contained nonce with the stored, old nonce.
If a valid boot ticket is present, Lazarus Core boots into the
business logic. This stack may execute as long as it can acquire fresh
deferral tickets from the hub. Business logic can also authenticate
itself to the hub using its AliasID and DeviceID credentials and
may retrieve boot tickets. Ticket acquisition from the hub can be
implemented as a task in an OS.
The only parts of Lazarus active while untrusted software runs
are TEETrigger and the logic regulating access to critical peripher-
als. This code has no access to secrets, making side channel attacks
pointless. The TEE exposes a small set of well-defined interfaces to
allow untrusted software to interact with TEETrigger and to use
critical peripherals.
Similar to [54], detection of compromise and identification of
vulnerabilities is not in our scope.We consider such lines of work or-
thogonal to our approach [53]. Availability of devices due to attacks
on the communication channel or by making the hub unavailable
are discussed in [54].
5 IMPLEMENTATION
Our goal is to demonstrate that Lazarus can be implemented even
on low-cost devices. Therefore, we implemented a prototype for a
low-end COTS MCU from the NXP LPC5500 series [33]. The price
for MCUs in this category ranges from cents to a few dollars [17].
While first MCUs based on the ARMv8-M specification have only
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Figure 5: Overview of the implemented functionality along
with execution modes and privilege levels.
recently been released, we expect this generation of MCUs to find
wide adoption on the market.
We chose the LPCXpresso55S69 development board [32] as a
target for our implementation. The board is equipped with an NXP
LPC55S69 (revision 0A) MCU, peripherals such as an accelerometer
and several expansion ports. The LPC55S69 MCU features a dual
core 32-bit ARM Cortex-M33 processor based on the ARMv8-M
architecture [3] running at 96 MHz with TrustZone-M, 320 KB of
SRAM, 640 KB of flash, a watchdog timer, a HRNG, crypto acceler-
ation and DICE support [31, 35]. Since our board does not include
networking hardware, we attached an off-the-shelf Wi-Fi chip, the
ESP8266 [13], to one of the board’s USARTs via one of the expan-
sion ports. The ESP8266’s serial port connection to the USART runs
at 115,200 baud, thus limiting the network bandwidth to about 14
KB per second.
With TrustZone-M, the Cortex-M CPU can be in secure or non-
secure mode. Each mode has a privileged and an unprivileged level.
Non-secure execution can invoke the secure world through Non-
Secure Callable (NSC) functions. Peripherals can be configured as
fully secure, fully non-secure or split into secure and non-secure
partitions. When the CPU is in a secure state, it can access both
the secure and the non-secure world. In contrast, the processor can
access only the non-secure resources when it is in a non-secure
state.
The MCU hosts a secure AMBA AHB5 controller [2, 35] which
allows configuring the whole memory map including flash, RAM
and peripherals as secure/non-secure and privileged/unprivileged.
The ARM AMBA AHB5 protocol introduces signaling for secure
and non-secure transactions and therefore extends the TrustZone
technology from the processor to the entire system. Lazarus can
be implemented on any ARMv8-M microcontroller that allows
securing our critical peripherals, which holds for every ARMv8-M
microcontroller currently on the market.
Our prototype splits the different functions of Lazarus into sep-
arate binaries running in different tiers as illustrated in Figure 5
and explained in the following. The deployment of the binaries
and their execution in secure and non-secure mode led to the flash
layout depicted in Figure 6.
We implemented the Lazarus prototype in C. Table 1 summarizes
the Lines of Code (LoC) of our prototype, measured with Lizard [47].
The Lazarus functionality executed in the secure world, consisting
of DICE++, Lazarus Core (LZ Core) and Core Patcher (CP), has less
than 5k LoC in total. The update downloader (UD) has about 1.4k
Table 1: LoC of the different components of our prototype.
DICE++ LZ Core CP UD Crypto CMSIS NXP
1,668 2,753 571 1,359 3,564 1,764 5,682
LoC. In addition, our prototype uses parts of the RIoT crypto library
[27], and parts of the CMSIS and NXP hardware-specific code.
Both CMSIS and NXP are relatively large bodies of headers and
support libraries that implement a hardware abstraction layer for
a large number of different hardware features of the Memory Pro-
tection Unit (MPU). Our prototype uses only a small number of
these hardware features and a similarly small fraction of the CMSIS
and NXP code. We excluded code (e.g., header and C files) that our
prototype obviously does not use from the counts in Table 1. Even
so, the CMSIS and NXP numbers still overestimate the amount of
code used in our prototype, as separating all unused code would
have been a complex task.
DICE and DICE++. As the NXP LPC55S69 supports DICE accord-
ing to the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification [50], we
do not have to implement DICE ourselves. DICE executes directly
out of ROM after device reset before any other software is executed.
For this reason, we cannot modify DICE, which is why we imple-
mented DICE++ as a separate binary executed right after DICE.
The MCU executes the first code from flash after DICE from ad-
dress 0x00000000, which is where we placed DICE++. We calculate
static_sym using HMAC-SHA256 at each boot. Instead of using the
UDS (which we cannot access because DICE latches it), we derive
static_sym from the CDI which DICE passes to DICE++. This does
not weaken the security model because we remove the CDI before
passing control to the next layer and hand over only a re-derivation
of the CDI:
CDI ′ := HMAC(CDI ,Hash(Lazarus_Core))
DICE++ derives core_auth and CDI’ using HMAC-SHA256.
For DICE++, we only need to protect dev_uuid and the DICE++
binary itself from being overwritten by the following layers. To
ensure this, we execute DICE++ in secure privileged mode and all
following layers as either secure unprivileged or non-secure. We
also use the secure AHB controller to WRLatch DICE++ including
dev_UU ID. The secure AHB controller can only be configured
when executing secure privileged. Once activated, it cannot be re-
configured or switched off until the next reset. This forces us to
activate all required latches at once during TEE configuration. For
this reason, we configured the secure AHB controller in DICE++
to also WRLatch code and data of Lazarus core that we execute in
secure unprivileged mode. We also use the secure AHB controller to
map the critical peripherals into the secure world before executing
untrusted software.
Lazarus Core. Lazarus Core is responsible for deriving the token
dev_auth for Lazarus updates, for DeviceID and AliasID derivation,
for boot ticket verification, for boot nonce generation, for checking
if authorized code is present or whether an update must be applied,
for verifying and applying staged updates, and for regulating access
to critical peripherals.
Non-Secure FlashSecure Flash
Update
Downloader Data
…Staging
Area
Core
PatcherDICE++
Lazarus
Core
0x00000000 0xFFFFFFFF
Business
Logic
Figure 6: Layout of the binaries in flash memory along with
their execution mode.
For secure communication with the hub, Lazarus Core derives
the DeviceID andAliasID fromCDI’ and provides the signedAliasID
to untrusted software as input mapped to specific RAM regions. For
these derivations, Lazarus uses elliptic-curve cryptography with
the prime256v1 curve. The public keys are embedded into X.509
certificates and the DeviceID certificate is signed by the hub in order
to establish a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). For the derivation of
dev_auth, Lazarus Core uses HMAC-SHA256.
To regulate access to critical peripherals and to interact with
TEETrigger, Lazarus Core sets up NSC functions as an interface for
untrusted software. We implemented several of these NSC func-
tions, i.e., handlers, for controlling access to critical peripherals. For
our implementation we considered the FMC, the power control
peripheral, and the WDT as critical [35]. The handler for the WDT
implements the TEETrigger deferral logic. For deferral ticket nonce
generation, the handler uses the HRNG.
Our handler for the power control peripheral ensures a device
can only be put into those low-power states that do not affect
TEETrigger. Its underlyingWDT is driven by theMCU’s FRO_1MHz
clock. Whether this clock is running depends on the power state
of the MCU. In active and sleep mode, it is enabled. However, in
deep sleep, the state of the clock can be configured off by software.
In the power-down modes the clock is off, which is why we block
deep sleep and power-down requests.
Our handler for the FMC allows untrusted software only writes
to flash memory allocated to untrusted software and to the staging
area. Untrusted software thus remains capable of persisting data to
specific flash regions, e.g., for providing boot and deferral tickets
or staging updates. In addition, the handler implements a simple
threshold scheme that disallows excessive flashmemory writes. The
protection of critical peripherals is not transparent to untrusted
software. For this purpose, we modified the relevant libraries to
use the handler function instead of directly interacting with the
peripheral.
Core Patcher. In general, Lazarus Core is responsible for verifying
and applying updates. However, as it cannot update itself in flash, in
case a Lazarus Core update is present on the staging area, Lazarus
Core only verifies this update and then invokes the Core Patcher.
The Core Patcher’s sole responsibility is to apply the Lazarus Core
update. Like Lazarus Core, the Core Patcher runs in the secure
world and can only be invoked by Lazarus Core itself. This design
makes it possible to update all binaries except DICE++.
Update Downloader. The update downloader is part of Lazarus,
but as it implements a networking stack for communicating with
the hub, it is considered untrusted software. This is why we execute
it in the non-secure world. Our handler for the FMC peripheral
ensures that the update downloader can only write to specific areas
in flash memory and thus not overwrite itself or other parts of
Lazarus in case of compromise.
We used the ESP8266 Wi-Fi chip [13] for TCP/IP communication
with the hub and implemented our own format for headers for
binary updates. We sign all messages exchanged between the de-
vice and the hub with their respective private keys and ensure the
freshness of critical messages using nonces for tickets and version
numbers for updates. We implemented the update downloader as
a bare-metal application. An advantage of our implementation is
that the embedded OS Lazarus protects does not necessarily need
to implement its own update mechanism.
Our prototype treats the ESP8266 as a fixed-function peripheral
that is not subject to compromise. However, the ESP8266 has been
compromised in the past [7]. The ESP8266 is effectively another
small microcontroller running its own firmware stored in flash. It
also exposes a firmware update interface. We disabled this interface
by connecting its GPIO0 pin to 3.3V.
Vulnerabilities in the ESP8266 firmware might still allow an
attacker to overwrite it and thus completely cut off our network
connection. Such attacks might originate with the untrusted soft-
ware or on the network. One can envision several defenses based
on Lazarus or CIDER primitives to protect the ESP8266. For ex-
ample, a more robust version of the ESP8266 could write-latch its
firmware early in boot, such that it cannot be overwritten even if
a potential vulnerability is exploited. Lazarus could also support
ESP8266 firmware updates and treat the ESP8266 as a critical device
by placing trusted handlers between the ESP8266 and untrusted
software.
Business Logic. We implemented two applications representing
real-world use cases. The first application is a traffic light controller
which controls LEDs via GPIO. The second application periodically
measures the temperature through an ADC sensor and records
the values in flash. Both applications run as tasks on FreeRTOS.
We implemented the functionality for acquiring boot and deferral
tickets as a separate task in FreeRTOS. This task uses the ESP8266
for the communication with the hub.
Hub and Provisioning Environment. Neither the hub nor the pro-
visioning environment are part of the core Lazarus device imple-
mentation. However, in order to be able to perform a complete
evaluation of Lazarus, we also implemented very simple prototypes
of a hub and a provisioning environment.
We implemented the hub in Python. The hub supports receiving
AliasID certificates from the device, exchanging boot and deferral
tickets and sending firmware updates. It is also able to issue an up-
dated signed device configuration, e.g. to change Wi-Fi credentials,
certificates or the hub’s address.
For device provisioning, we implemented a Python script that
builds (using gcc-arm-none-eabi) and flashes the different bina-
ries. At first boot, the MCU allows access to its memory via the
SWD Debug Interface using the NXP Link2 debugger to retrieve
the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) for the DeviceID certificate,
static_sym and dev_uuid , and to deploy the signed DeviceID along
with the trust anchors for the hub and for code signing. The script
also writes a device configuration data structure containing initial
Wi-Fi credentials and the hub address.
Table 2: Size in bytes of our binaries.
Layer DICE++ LZ Core CP UD Untrusted
Size (bytes) 10,720 43,156 7,676 22,332 1,640
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze our prototype regarding its code size,
its boot and runtime performance impact, as well as regarding its
networking overhead. In the experiments in which the device com-
municates with the hub, we ran our simple hub prototype on a
Lenovo Thinkpad T490s (with an Intel Core i7-8665U processor,
8 GB of DDR4 RAM and an Intel AC9560 wireless adapter) running
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS and Python 3.6. The hub and the device commu-
nicated via Wi-Fi through a lightly loaded AVM Fritz!Box 7362 SL
wireless router.
Code size: Table 2 shows the size of the Lazarus binaries. Un-
trusted is the part of Lazarus that runs as part of the untrusted
business logic, mainly the fetching of boot and deferral tickets. We
calculated the Untrusted size as the difference between the sizes
of the business logic binaries compiled with and without Lazarus.
In sum, Lazarus takes up about 93 kB, which is about 14% of the
flash memory on the NXP LPC55S69. Lazarus thus leaves enough
resources for business logic. Our prototype has not been subject
to extensive code and binary optimization. Not depicted in Table 2,
Lazarus reserves 8 kB of RAM, i.e., 2.5%, mapped to the secure
world, unavailable to the non-secure world.
Boot time: We measured the boot time overhead as the time that
elapses from the execution of the first instruction of the Lazarus
boot loader to the execution of the first instruction of the business
logic. We measured this time with an attached external device as
our measurement tool. We used a second NXP LPC55S69 MCU.
We added instructions at the start and the end of the execution of
the boot loader to toggle a dedicated GPIO pin to signal the mea-
surement device to take a timestamp. We conducted 100 separate
runs. We present average values only, as the standard deviation
was below 1%.
The results are displayed in Table 3. In the case in which Lazarus
Core boots the business logic directly, we measured a total overhead
of less than 1.5 seconds. Most of this time is spent computing cryp-
tographic primitives, e.g., boot ticket verification, in Lazarus Core
using the RIoT crypto library [27] which does not use the MCU’s
crypto accelerators. We consider this measurement a worst-case
estimate, showing that Lazarus also performs well on MCUs with-
out cryptographic accelerators. Drastic speed-ups can be achieved
using accelerators. For example, according to the documentation
for the NXP LPC55S69, computing ECDSA-secp256r1 Sign + Verify
takes only 116 ms [35].
Without a valid boot ticket, Lazarus Core runs the update down-
loader. In our scenario, the downloader contacts the hub with its
AliasID, retrieves and stages a boot ticket and resets the device.
This takes around 3.4 seconds in total.
The third part of Table 3 displays the total boot time if the hub
requires a firmware update to be installed. We have omitted the
individual stages of this process, as large parts of it are a repetition
Table 3: Impact on boot time, depending on the presence of
a valid boot ticket in the staging area.
Boot Path Layer Time Layer (ms) Time Total (ms)
w. Ticket DICE++ 152 152
LZ Core 1,297 1,449
w/o Ticket DICE++ 152 152
LZ Core 1,025 1,178
UD 754 1,932
DICE++ 152 2,084
LZ Core 1,310 3,394
w. patch 15,720
of the second case (i.e., no boot ticket). After booting through
DICE++ and Lazarus Core, the update downloader contacts the
hub and receives instructions to download a firmware update. In
the experiment in Table 3, it downloads and stages a 58 KB update
containing FreeRTOS and several applications. After twomore reset
cycles, which install the update and obtain a boot ticket, the device
finally boots into the newly installed firmware. As shown in Table 3,
the entire process takes less than 16 seconds.
Runtime overhead: We measured the runtime overhead of Laza-
rus against a workload consisting of FreeRTOS running our two
apps: the traffic light controller and the ADC sensor app. For the
baseline measurements, we ran this workload unmodified and with-
out the Lazarus TrustZone component interposing between the
workload and the hardware. For example, flash writes performed
by the workload go directly to flash memory.
The Lazarus variant of the experiment runs the Lazarus Trust-
Zone component which disables direct access by FreeRTOS and the
applications to the flash storage controller, the power controller
and the watchdog timer. As an alternative, Lazarus exposes the
TrustZone handler functions described in Section 5. The FreeR-
TOS workload is recompiled with libraries that redirect accesses
to the three devices to the TrustZone handlers. In addition, we
run a TEETrigger service application on FreeRTOS that obtains a
deferral ticket from the hub over the network and passes the ticket
to TEETrigger running in TrustZone.
In each case, we used the FreeRTOS benchmarking feature to
measure the CPU utilization. We compared the CPU idle time of the
bare FreeRTOS app without Lazarus to our Lazarus implementation
to obtain the total overhead.
Our measurements are summarized in Table 4. We measured
a total overhead of 0.8% when acquiring a deferral ticket every
minute with our task in FreeRTOS and verifying it with TEETrigger.
A deferral ticket fetching interval of one or only a few minutes is
unreasonably short and was chosen only to demonstrate that the
overhead remains low even in this extreme case. Fetching deferral
tickets in intervals of multiple hours or days is more realistic for
most IoT use cases and leads to only negligible overhead.
In addition, we measured the overhead of only writing one flash
page (512 kB) with and without Lazarus, i.e. writing to flash via
the handler versus writing to flash directly. This overhead is about
0.19 % and thus negligible.
Table 4: Runtime performance impact for ticket fetching
and verification with different deferral intervals.
Ticket Fetch Interval 1min 5min 10min 1 h 24 h
Perf. Impact (%) 0.80 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.001
Table 5: Time required for ticket fetching and verification.
Total Non-Secure Secure Network
Fetch Time (ms) 455 145 310 737
Table 6: TCP payload sizes in bytes for different messages
exchanged between device and hub.
Message Type Bytes Total Request Response
Boot Ticket 288 144 144
Deferral Ticket 288 144 144
Send AliasID (max) 1,003 1,001 2
In a second experiment, we measured the (wall clock) time re-
quired for fetching and verifying a single deferral ticket. We used
the samemeasurement methodology as in the boot time experiment,
using an external device to take time stamps based on GPIO signals.
Once again, we repeated each experiment 100 times. Table 5 shows
the time spent on computing tasks (Total) and the time that elapsed
between sending a ticket request to the hub and receiving the ticket
(Network). The latter time does not affect the overhead, as FreeR-
TOS can assign the processor to other tasks in the meantime. The
table also shows how the total compute time is split between the
TrustZone handler (Secure) and the untrusted service application
(Non-secure).
Networking: Table 6 shows the TCP payload sizes for various
messages exchanged with the hub. Requesting tickets is imple-
mented as sending and receiving a Lazarus authenticated header
containing a type-field, nonce, digest and signature as well as a
payload. In case of a boot ticket, the payload is just a fixed 4 byte
value, in case of a deferral ticket, the payload is the requested de-
ferral time in milliseconds, also as a 4 byte value. This header is
of size 140 bytes, totaling response and reply with payload to 288
bytes. Sending the AliasID certificate to the hub takes less than one
kilobyte, depending on the actual size of the certificate, which can
vary.
The total TCP payload size of a boot in the update downloader
path with subsequent ticket fetching in the business logic is less
than 2,800 bytes, omitted from Table 6. This includes sending the
AliasID and retrieving the boot ticket in the downloader, and sub-
sequent sending of the AliasID and retrieval of both a deferral and
boot ticket in the business logic. After a normal boot with a valid
boot ticket, data of less than 1,600 bytes are exchanged, i.e., sending
the AliasID in the business logic and retrieving a boot and deferral
ticket. Subsequent fetches of deferral tickets require only 288 bytes.
Summary: To summarize, our evaluation shows that the over-
head in terms of communication, flash and RAM requirements is
modest even for resource-constrained devices. The same holds for
the runtime overhead for the communication with the hub. In con-
trast, the increase in boot times until executing business logic is
not negligible. However, we expect that resetting a device is an
infrequent event, e.g., when a device needs to be serviced, or when
the hub suspects misbehavior. The result is a good tradeoff between
performance and security gain. We seek to improve the required
boot time with a more optimized implementation in future versions,
e.g., using hardware cryptographic accelerators.
7 SECURITY DISCUSSION
Our goal is to ensure recoverability of IoT devices even if the un-
trusted software is completely compromised. We achieve this goal
if the hub is able to enforce the software stack the device executes
within a time bound. This means that soon after the hub decides
to deploy new software, i.e., an update/patch, onto the device, our
recovery TCB must be executed to retrieve and apply a new version.
We must assume that the attacker not only deploys malware that
tries to resist recovery but also tries to permanently render devices
useless. Our attacker with full control over untrusted software and
possibly with access to the communication channel could try to
use the following vectors to attack availability:
A-1 Manipulate or block the communication channel between de-
vice and hub.
A-2 Attempt to tamper with Lazarus by interfering with its execu-
tion, by overwriting it or by forging updates.
A-3 Tamper with peripherals to permanently render devices ir-
recoverable. Examples are wear out of flash storage, shutting
devices down or setting them into irrecoverable low-power
states, or manipulating the firmware of other peripherals.
A-4 Prevent or defer device reset, e.g, by manipulating or turning
off TEETrigger or by forging deferral tickets.
A-5 Inject malware into untrusted software and try to persist it
across resets.
A-6 Deceive the hub about the application of updates to Lazarus.
A-1 is only possible for a limited time. Our attack model states
that attacks on the communication channel can eventually be de-
tected and removed by the Internet Service Provider (ISP). The
effect of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on ticket fetching or hub
availability were already discussed by Xu et al. [54] who observed
that DoS attacks typically last less than 48 hours [43].
To protect against A-2 and A-3, we isolated the trusted compo-
nents and critical peripherals from untrusted software. We used
a TEE to latch trusted components and to map critical peripher-
als into the secure world. To enforce this, we simply configured
TrustZone-M and the secure AHB controller on our prototype. Thus,
an attacker is unable to misuse critical peripherals, e.g., overwriting
Lazarus in flash, causing flash wear out, deactivating TEETrigger’s
WDT, or by switching into an irrecoverable low power state.
We kept the interface between the untrusted and the trusted
components very simple. The runtime component contains only
TEETrigger and the handlers for critical peripherals. TEETrigger
only verifies a simple, fixed data structure, and the flash write
handler, merely evaluates whether flash writes are excessive or
target a certain area. The runtime component does not process
any secrets. Thus, our system is by design not susceptible to side-
channel attacks. Untrusted input to Lazarus Core processed during
boot time must be located in the staging area. Every structure in
the staging area has a well-defined format and requires a valid
signature from the hub. For the verification of all data structures,
we provisioned the device with public keys in a secure environment.
We prevent A-4 by placing TEETrigger inside the TEE and by
using a simple interface into the TEE. This ensures the correct
execution of TEETrigger which, by construction, will force a device
reset unless regularly provided with a new deferral ticket from the
hub. Deferral tickets are freshness-protected and only valid when
signed with the hub private key.
Regarding A-5, the attacker can compromise the untrusted soft-
ware according to our threat model. The attacker’s code can run
on the device until the next reset. The hub can force such a reset
by refusing to issue TEETrigger deferral tickets (e.g., because it
became aware of the attack).
If the attack was not persistent, the reset will remove it from
the device. The attacker may be able to reinfect the device using
the same method as the first time (e.g., exploiting the same vulner-
ability). Either way, the hub can (and should) deploy a software
update that disables future attacks (e.g., by patching the vulnera-
bility). Lazarus enables the hub to do so irrespective of the state of
the device.
If the attack persisted itself, it must have changed storage. If this
change affected storage that is hashed by DICE (e.g., executable
code), the hash values will also change. Thus, attestation to the
hub will fail, and the hub can force a reset and update as in the
nonpersistent case.
One can also envision data-only vulnerabilities that allow an
attacker to take control by changing data the hashed code will
read (e.g., configuration data read during OS boot) but that are not
included in the hash because they can change over time. While
such persistent changes would not manifest themselves in changed
DICE hashes, the device could still be recovered unconditionally
by using Lazarus to patch the vulnerable code and the exploit data.
If the downloader is free of flaws, it can retrieve updates without
obstacle. However, we did not assume that the downloader is free of
vulnerabilities. Lazarus latches the downloader in flash, such that
malware cannot overwrite it. It also activates TEETrigger before
running the downloader. This ensures that a reset will eventually
occur. A DoS on the downloader is possible as long as it can be
re-compromised after each reset. The hub can detect such attacks
(as it will fail to see device attestations for the software update) and
block the attack with the help of the ISP.
For defending against A-6, we pointed out non-forgeability and
freshness of the relevant cryptographic messages sent between the
device and the hub in Subsection 4.4. This only allows devices that
indeed applied an update of a trusted component to provide proof
to the hub.
In summary, Lazarus allows a device to be reliably recovered
and its software (including Lazarus) to be updated within a time
bound that can be configured by the hub.
8 APPLICATION IN REAL-WORLD USE CASES
Before applying Lazarus in a real-world use case, the developer has
to configure Lazarus based on the peripherals on the device and
based on the demands of the target application. This may require
writing new trusted handlers to regulate access to critical periph-
erals and tailoring our prototype to concrete IoT scenarios, device
types and specific peripherals, e.g., sensors or additional flash stor-
age attached via Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI). In particular, all
peripherals that can possibly be misused by compromised business
logic have to be guarded by TEE handlers. For example, flash write
handlers must implement a threshold or rate limiting to distinguish
regular write activities from targeted flash wear out. In addition,
business logic must be implemented such that it does not exceed
handler thresholds during regular operation. This should be easy
since the behavior of many IoT applications is quite regular and
known in advance.
In addition to writing trusted handlers, the developer has to
modify the IoT business logic to call these handlers instead of trying
to access the peripherals directly. Such attempts would fail, as the
peripherals are protected by TrustZone from access by untrusted
software.
Further, integration of Lazarus requires setting a reasonable
deferral timeout and determining the desired behavior in case the
device cannot contact the hub, e.g. because of a DoS attack, as
discussed in [54]. A possibility is to boot into a safe-mode version
of the software with minimal functionality as long as the hub is
unavailable. However, this strongly depends on the IoT use case
the system is tailored for.
Lazarus can accommodate use cases that include code running
in a TEE by running both the Lazarus runtime component and the
business logic’s TEE code in the TEE. Depending on the size and
the quality of the latter, this may increase the attack surface of the
TEE code.
9 RELATEDWORK
Mechanisms for remote administration of servers have been estab-
lished in several industry standards [11, 21, 22]. These standards
enable the efficient remote configuration, monitoring and update of
a large number of devices irrespective of the state of their applica-
tion processor and running software. Devices are equipped with an
additional co-processor able to interrupt the application processor,
and possibly with a separate physical network interface. This allows
administrators to restore hung or compromised systems, or even
to activate servers that are shut down. This achieves recoverability.
However, the system design of adding isolated co-processors and
possibly separate network interfaces is not an option for IoT devices
in the low-cost segment, especially not for constrained devices.
Several mechanisms for automated malware detection and evic-
tion from end-user devices have been proposed [15, 19, 28]. This line
of work focuses on security in a higher layer and has a large TCB,
i.e., the OS kernel, a component Lazarus considers untrusted. An
architecture which leverages system virtualization for automated
detection and containment of rootkit attacks on Linux systems was
proposed by Baliga et al. [6]. Lazarus also considers hypervisors
untrusted components and can recover them.
Android Things [16] is a commercial secure IoT platform. It can
be regarded as a full-fledged trustworthy IoT ecosystem with an OS
and a bootloader for compliant device architectures which enforces
secure boot, runtime isolation, attestation, hardware-based key pro-
tection, and handles remote updates. IoT use cases are engineered
on top of the platform and can make use of the security services the
OS provides, e.g., for attestation or authentication. The focus is on
powerful Cortex-A devices. There is, to the best of our knowledge,
no means of recovering from a compromised OS.
For constrained devices, several secure update mechanisms have
been proposed, mainly for sensor networks in combination with
attestation [1, 14, 20, 23, 36, 40, 41]. After trying to distribute the
update, the server requests an attestation proof of successful update
application. If the update fails (e.g., because malware is preventing
it), the compromised devices are revoked and require manual re-
pair. In contrast, Lazarus permits remote recovery of all devices.
Some mechanisms allow wiping malware, e.g., with secure memory
erasure [1, 20, 36]. However, common to all mechanisms is that
they cannot reliably recover from compromise of the host system
and that they have no provision to force execution of recovery
functionality.
Asokan et al. [4] propose an architecture for secure software
updates on MCUs. They keep the secure update mechanism and
key material in read-only segments protected from the rest of the
possibly malicious system. They built prototypes on two device
types, HYDRA and Cortex-M. The update functionality on HYDRA
is loaded as the initial user space process with highest priority after
starting an seL4 kernel upon successful secure boot. The isolation of
the task’s code and data is ensured by the seL4 kernel’s separation.
In contrast, our goal is to decouple the recovery TCB from OSs
or hypervisors. The Cortex-M prototype uses TrustZone-M for
isolation and executes the update functionality as part of a trusted
bootloader. Asokan et al. do not propose a mechanism that returns
control to the recovery TCB after infection and provide no way to
service the read-only update functionality.
CIDER [54] is most closely related to our work and lays the ar-
chitectural foundation for Lazarus. CIDER appears to be targeted
primarily at higher-end devices for which security features such
as storage latches are common. The higher baseline cost of such
devices (≥ $100) also makes it reasonable to add missing security
support by attaching hardware costing a few dollars to an exten-
sion port. CIDER did this for its external AWDT. The situation is
fundamentally different for the cheap low-end boards which are
the focus of our work. While CIDER was also implemented on a
low-end MCU, this prototype inherits the properties of its higher-
end cousins, including an AWDT implementation on a separate
MCU board. The paper mentions cheaper alternatives without ex-
ploring them. In contrast, Lazarus demonstrates how a wide range
of protections can be implemented at zero cost in TEE software.
In addition, Lazarus provides protection against a range of attacks
aiming to disable the device and enables easy updates of the entire
TCB.
The TCG resilience work group provides no concrete implemen-
tation [52]. Auer et al. [5] only mention integration of an AWDT
and recovery TCB into a secure architecture for RISC-V.
10 CONCLUSION
We present Lazarus, a system for the recovery of compromised
low-end IoT devices. Lazarus overcomes three major challenges in
the design of cyber-resilient IoT architectures. These challenges are
applicability on low-cost COTS devices, defense against malware
actively trying to make devices unavailable, and practical updates
of the recovery TCB. Lazarus uses a TEE to constrain malware.
As TEEs are nowadays available even on low-cost devices, Laza-
rus can be deployed on a broad range of COTS devices. We use the
TEE to latch the recovery TCB, isolate our reset trigger TEETrigger
and regulate access to critical peripherals. The latter prevents mal-
ware from rendering devices permanently unavailable through
misuse of peripherals, such as entering irrecoverable sleep states or
flash wear out, otherwise possible within minutes [46]. For practical
updates of the recovery TCB, we propose an extension to DICE.
This extension allows sustaining the device identity through secure
re-association with the hub.
We have implemented Lazarus on a COTS ARMv8-M MCU fea-
turing TrustZone-M. Our prototype has low memory requirements,
negligible runtime performance impact and modest boot time im-
pact, making Lazarus suitable for adoption in a broad range of IoT
use cases.
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